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THE INSURED'S RIGHT TO CHOOSE
DEFENSE COUNSEL
I. INTRODUCTION
Virtually every adult American purchases some type of liability in-
surance and thus becomes an "insured." Common types of insurance
contracts include automobile liability coverage, homeowner's liability
coverage, and liability coverage for a business establishment. Liability
insurance policies generally contain two provisions of importance to the
insured. First, the insurance contract promises payment of judgments
rendered against the insured as a result of occurrences covered by the
policy. While the scope of coverage varies, insurance policies usually do
not cover occurrences resulting from intentional conduct. In addition to
liability coverage, most insurance policies include a defense clause
wherein the insurance company agrees to defend the insured against lia-
bility claims.
In most cases, the insurance company and its insured have a com-
mon interest in defeating the lawsuit. There are, however, numerous sce-
narios where the interests of the insured and the insurer may conflict.
Because the typical defense clause in an insurance contract affords the
insurance company complete control over the insured's defense, the in-
sured may be forced to accept defense by an attorney retained by a poten-
tial adversary.
Although Oklahoma courts have not yet addressed this issue, a
number of courts have required insurance companies to pay for an in-
dependent attorney selected by the insured if a conflict of interest arises.1
However, this trend has been criticized for its harsh economic impact on
insurance companies. Some jurisdictions have mitigated this impact by
adopting a moderate position which is beneficial to the interests of both
parties. Both Oklahoma courts and the state legislature should consider
adopting a similar moderate position requiring insurance companies to
provide an impartial defense by independent counsel if a conflict of inter-
est exists between the insurance company and its insured.
1. See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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II. THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST SCENARIO
A typical liability insurance policy contains a clause which provides
that the insurance company will defend the insured against lawsuits
which allege occurrences covered by the policy.2 The defense clause
within the insurance policy generally provides both a duty to defend the
insured and a right to assume control of the defense.3 Although insureds
may regard such a defense clause as inserted for their own benefit, the
primary purpose of such clauses is to protect the insurance company by
allowing it to control the litigation or settlement of the case.4
When a third party brings suit against an insured, the insurer's duty
to defend is usually determined by the allegations in the claim. If the suit
alleges conduct or an occurrence which the policy covers, then the in-
surer is contractually bound to undertake the defense.' Suits alleging
both covered and non-covered occurrences generally trigger the insurer's
duty to defend.6 However, the duty to defend may not be readily appar-
ent from the face of the allegations. A few courts have held that the
insurance company must defend its insured where any possibility exists
that a trial court could find the insured liable for an occurrence that the
policy covers-even though the third party's suit specified only a non-
covered occurrence.7
Once an insured makes a claim, an insurer who doubts whether the
2. M. Berch & R. Berch, Will the Real Counsel for the Insured Please Rise?, 19 ARIz. ST. L.J.
27, 29 (1987); Comment, Reexamining Conflicts of Interest: When is Private Counsel Necessary?, 17
PAC. L.J. 1421, 1423 (1986). See also Dugas Pest Control v. Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co.,
504 So. 2d 1051, 1053 (La. Ct. App. 1987); Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 383, 388, 267 A.2d
7, 9 (1970).
3. Norman v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 218 Va. 718, 720, 239 S.E.2d 902, 903 (1978). The
court quoted the relevant provision as follows: "'the company shall have the right and duty to
defend any suit against'the insured seeking damages ... '" Id.; Comment, Reservation of Rights
Notices and Nonwaiver Agreements, 12 PAC. L.J. 763, 763 (1981).
4. See Nandorf, Inc. v. CNA Ins. Cos., 134 Ill. App. 3d 134, 136, 479 N.E.2d 988, 991 (1985);
Burd, 56 N.J. at 388-89, 267 A.2d at 10; 7C J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 4681 (1979); Bianchesi, Coverage Disputes with the Insured: The Insurer's Perspective, 48 INS.
COUNS. J. 153, 153 (1981); Note, Use of the Declaratory Judgment to Determine a Liability Insurer's
Duty to Defend - Conflict of Interests, 41 IND. L.J. 87, 88 (1965).
5. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Louis A. Roser Co., 585 F.2d 932, 937 (8th Cir.
1978); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers, 64 Ill. 2d 187, 193, 355 N.E.2d 24, 28 (1976).
6. Rhodes v. Chicago Ins. Co., 719 F.2d 116, 119 (5th Cir. 1983); Maryland Casualty, 64 I11.
2d at 194, 355 N.E.2d at 28 (1976); Ferguson v. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co., 254 Or. 496, 506, 460
P.2d 342, 347 (1969).
7. Ferguson, 254 Or. at 507, 460 P.2d at 347. "For example, in an action of trespass brought
against the insured, if the complaint alleges a willful entry (in order to support a claim for punitive
damages), the plaintiff could, without amending the complaint, recover ordinary damages for a non-
willful entry. The insurer, therefore, would have the duty to defend. The innocent trespass may be
treated as a 'lesser included offense' by analogy to the criminal law." Id. See also Patrons Mut. Ins.
Ass'n. v. Harmon, 240 Kan. 707, 710, 732 P.2d 741, 744 (1987).
[Vol. 24:281
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INSURANCE DEFENSE COUNSEL
claim is covered by the policy faces a number of choices. Frequently, the
insurer will agree to defend the insured while explicitly reserving the
right to contest coverage later. The insurance company may accomplish
this unilaterally by notifying the insured that the insurer reserves its
rights to contest coverage, or bilaterally through a nonwaiver agreement
signed by the insured. 9 Alternatively, the insurance company may seek a
declaratory judgment to determine whether it must defend the insured. 10
Finally, the insurer may refuse to either defend or seek declaratory judg-
ment; 1 however, this choice involves the risk that a court may later find
this action to be unjustified.' Of course, the insurer may simply choose
to defend without a reservation of rights or nonwaiver agreement, 13
although it will be estopped from claiming non-coverage later should the
insured be found liable.' 4
Any dispute over coverage and the insurer's duty to defend may
portend a conflict of interest between the insurer and its insured. Such a
conflict commonly arises when the third party's suit contains allegations
based on negligence, which generally would be covered under most liabil-
ity policies, and allegations of intentional behavior, which generally
would not be covered by the policy."' Another conflict of interest scena-
rio arises when an insurer denies coverage based on issues not pertinent
to the underlying suit, such as lapse of coverage. 6 Additionally, where
the underlying suit claims both compensatory and punitive damages, a
court may find a conflict of interest. 7 A conflict may also exist where
8. Saxon, Conflicts of Interest: Insurers' Expanding Duty to Defend and the Impact of 'Cumis'
Counsel, 23 IDAHO L. REv. 351, 352 (1986-87).
9. Motorists Mut. Ins. v. Trainor, 33 Ohio St. 2d 41, 45, 294 N.E.2d 874, 877 (1973).
10. Pekin Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 134 Ill. App. 3d 31, 34-35, 479 N.E.2d 1078, 1081 (1985);
Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 405, 347 A.2d 842, 848 (1975); Note, Declaratory
Judgment, supra note 4, 95-96. See also Metropolitan Property & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Kirkwood, 729
F.2d 61 (1st Cir. 1984).
11. Poust, Insurers' Tender to Insureds of Right to Choose Counsel at Insurers' Expense: When
Need This Be Done?, 51 INS. COUNS. J. 563, 564 (1984); Note, supra note 4, at 94-95.
12. Comment, Reexamining Conflicts of Interest: When is Private Counsel Necessary?, 17 PAC.
L.J. 1421, 1425-26 (1986). See, e.g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 104 (1966); Note, supra note 4, at 94-95.
13. Note, supra note 4, at 92-93.
14. Clemmons v. Travelers Ins. Co., 88 I11. 2d 469, 475, 430 N.E.2d 1104, 1107 (1981); Murphy
v. Urso, 88 Ill. 444, 451, 430 N.E.2d 1079, 1082 (1981).
15. See Dondanville, Defense Counsel Beware: The Perils of Conflicts of Interest, 26 TRIAL
LAW. GUIDE 408 (1983).
16. See Continental Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 608 P.2d 281, 289 (Alaska 1980) (in-
surer disclaimed liability on grounds that insured breached cooperation clause).
17. See Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goldfarb, 53 N.Y.2d 392, 425 N.E.2d 810 (1981). But see
Pennbank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 669 F. Supp. 122, 127 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (Because
compensatory damages, which are covered by insurance policies, are a prerequisite to an award of
1988]
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the insured's interests preclude settlement but the policy allows the in-
surer to settle without consent.18 Less commonly, courts have found that
a conflict exists when the insurer must defend two separate clients having
divergent interests.19
Courts have offered various explanations of the nature of the poten-
tial detriment to insureds. Some courts have expressed concerns that the
insurer's attorney might not provide a vigorous defense of the insured.2"
Other courts frankly recognize that an attorney hired by an insurer to
represent an insured may have dual allegiances.21 The attorney is ethi-
cally bound to represent the insured, yet the insurer pays the costs of
defense and is the source of future business.22 While the conflict of inter-
est is often subtle, blatant conflicts do occur, as where the same attorney
represents the insured in a tort action and subsequently represents the
insurance company in an action against the insured to deny coverage.23
III. THE GENESIS OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL TREND
In litigation involving insurance defense, the traditional rule was
that unless the insurer refused to defend or defended in bad faith, no
conflict of interest existed, and the insured had no right to control the
defense.24 Some courts have refused to consider the possible detriment to
insureds, reasoning that professional responsibility guidelines provide
that the insured is the attorney's only client, precluding any compromise
punitive damages, which are not covered, both insurer and insured share the common goal of avoid-
ing liability; thus, there is no conflict of interests.); Nandorf, Inc. v. CNA Ins. Cos., 134 Il1. App. 3d
134, 140, 479 N.E.2d 988, 993 (1985) (Although the court found a conflict of interest based on the
likelihood of a punitive damages award, the court stated "[o]ur finding that a conflict of interest
existed in the instant case is not meant to imply that an insured is entitled to independent counsel
whenever punitive damages are sought in the underlying action.").
18. Bianchesi, Coverage Disputes with the Insured; The Insurer's Perspective, 48 INS. COUNS. J.
153, 155 (1981) (citing Rogers v. Robson, 74 Ill. App. 3d 467, 392 N.E.2d 1365 (1979)).
19. See Murphy v. Urso, 88 Ill. 2d 444, 453-54, 430 N.E.2d 1079, 1083-84 (1981) (The interests
of both insureds required a finding that the other was liable, yet the same insurer faced the dilemma
of controlling both defense strategies.).
20. Continental, 608 P.2d at 289.
21. Tews Funeral Home, Inc. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1037, 1045 (7th Cir. 1987);
San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 358, 364, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 4941 498 (1984).
22. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Louis A. Roser Co., 585 F.2d 932, 938 n.5 (8th Cir.
1978). "Even the most optimistic view of human nature requires us to realize that an attorney
employed by an insurance company will slant his efforts, perhaps unconsciously, in the interests of
his real client - the one who is paying his fee and from whom he hopes to receive future business -
the insurance company." Id. See also Saxon, Conflicts of Interest: The Insurer's Expanding Duty to
Defend and the Impact of 'Cumis' Counsel, 23 IDAHO L. REV. 351 (1986-87).
23. See, e.g., Industrial Indem. Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 73 Cal. App. 3d 529. 140 Cal. Rptr.
806 (1977).
24. Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Rudco Oil & Gas Co., 129 F.2d 621, 626 (10th Cir. 1942).
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of the insured's interests.25 If the insurer refused to defend because of a
tangible conflict, the insured's only choice was to engage an independent
attorney at the insured's own expense.26
Although the language of the New York Court of Appeals in Prash-
ker v. United States Guarantee Co.27 has been regarded as the genesis of
the independent counsel trend, a much earlier case, Boise Motor Car Co.
v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co.,28 approved reimbursement of an in-
sured's attorney fees where the insurer's conduct endangered the in-
sured's best interests.29 In Boise, the insured refused to accept the
insurer's defense under full reservation of rights and retained his own
attorney, yet the insurer refused to withdraw its defense of the suit.3"
The Idaho Supreme Court found that such behavior constituted a waiver
by the insurer of its right to withdraw and that the insurer must pay the
cost of the attorney retained by the insured for protection against the
insurer.3 However, the opinion contains no general language supporting
the right of an insured to retain separate counsel when confronted with
other conflict of interest situations.
In contrast to the narrow Boise holding, the language in Prashker v.
United States Guarantee Co. broadly supports the right of an insured to
protection from conflicts of interest.32 In Prashker, the administratrix of
the deceased's estate sought declaratory judgment that the insurance pol-
icy covered the fatal accident, and thus the insurer was obligated to de-
fend against the underlying tort suit.33 The suit contained both covered
and non-covered allegations; however, the insurer declined coverage
based on a violation of a policy provision rather than a coverage issue.34
Because the violation or non-violation of the particular policy provision
25. Norman v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 218 Va. 718, 727, 239 S.E.2d 902, 907 (1978). "A
client may presume that his attorney has no interest which will interfere with his devotion to the
cause confided in him." Id.
26. Harbin v. Assurance Co. of Am., 308 F.2d 748, 750 (10th Cir. 1962). "[T]he court should
not force the insurer into the conflict of interests position which will result if defense of [the underly-
ing tort suit] is required." Id.
27. 1 N.Y.2d 584, 136 N.E.2d 871 (1956).
28. 62 Idaho 438, 112 P.2d 1011 (1941).
29. Id. at 449, 112 P.2d at 1016.
30. Id..
31. Id.
32. Prashker v. United States Guarantee Co., I N.Y.2d 584, 593, 136 N.E.2d 871, 876 (1956).
33. Id. at 587, 136 N.E.2d at 872.
34. Id. at 590, 136 N.E.2d at 874.
1988]
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would be developed at trial to determine whether the deceased was will-
fully reckless or merely negligent, the court found that declaratory judg-
ment was inappropriate.35 Further, in response to the insurer's plea that
its duty to defend should be discharged because its attorney would face a
conflict of interest, the court stated that should such a conflict arise, in-
sureds have the right to choose their own counsel at the insurer's
expense.3 6
Like Prashker, a number of jurisdictions have found the appoint-
ment of independent counsel proper, as opposed to the traditional action
for declaratory judgment. 37 The propriety of a declaratory judgment on
the issue of coverage and duty to defend is generally contingent on
whether coverage is contested on grounds that will be litigated in the
underlying suit. 38 For example, because the issue of intent is generally a
key element in the underlying tort suit, a declaratory judgment on that
issue would be inappropriate. However, declaratory judgment would be
appropriate if the insurer seeks to prove that the insured's policy has
lapsed, an issue not relevant to the underlying tort suit.39 Additionally,
at least one court has found that the doctrine of collateral estoppel,
which precludes relitigation of issues already adjudicated, prevents use of
the declaratory judgment.' Further, to decide whether the insured's
conduct was negligent or intentional in a declaratory judgment action
violates the injured third party's right to control litigation of the tort
claim.4'
35. Id. at 591, 136 N.E.2d at 875. "It would be premature to attempt to decide in a declaratory
judgment action without a jury, what the [third party plaintiff] is going to prove later at the trial or
trials of the negligence actions." Id.
36. Id. at 593, 136 N.E.2d at 876.
37. See, eg., Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Beals, 103 R.I. 623, 630-31, 240 A.2d 397, 402 (1968).
38. Continental Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc. 608 P.2d 281, 288-289 (Alaska 1980);
Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 405, 347 A.2d 842, 848-49 (1975); Employers' Fire
Ins. Co. v. Beals, 130 R.I. 623, 631, 240 A.2d 397, 401-02 (1968). See also Note, supra note 4, at 92.
39. See, e.g., Brohawn, 276 Md. at 405, 347 A.2d at 848-49. The court stated:
If the issue upon which coverage is denied were not the ultimate issue to be determined in a
pending suit by a third party, a declaratory judgment would be appropriate. But where, as
here, the question to be resolved in the declaratory judgment action will be decided in
pending actions, it is inappropriate to grant a declaratory judgment.
Id. at 406, 347 A.2d at 849.
40. Murphy v. Urso, 88 Ill. 2d 444, 455, 430 N.E.2d 1079, 1084 (1982). But see Note, supra
note 4, at 92.
41. Murphy, 88 Ill. App. 2d at 456, 430 N.E.2d at 1085. According to the court, a declaratory
judgment would prejudice the third party plaintiff by precluding her "opportunity to control the
venue and timing of the suit, an important consideration where court calendars are clogged." Id. at
456, 430 N.E.2d at 1085; Beals, 103 R.I. at 630, 240 A.2d at 402. "We are of the belief that to allow
insurance companies to litigate issues which are identical with ones to be tried later during the injury
suit would be tantamount to permitting insurance companies to assume unfairly the control and
command of the tort litigation." Id.
[Vol. 24:281
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Although the Prashker court's discussion of independent counsel
was merely dicta, other jurisdictions have embraced the concept. In
Magoun v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,42 the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts found that ambiguities in the insurance contract should
be resolved in favor of the insured. Accordingly, the insurer should pay
the costs of the insured's independent counsel after the insured refused to
accept defense by the insurer under reservation of rights.4 3 Although the
Magoun court's holding was narrowly restricted to the facts of the case,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit followed
Magoun in holding that an insurer may not shirk its duty to pay the costs
of defense by claiming the existence of a conflict of interest.'
Soon after the Magoun decision, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals
held that where an insurer placed itself in conflict with its insured's best
interests by denying coverage, the insurer must pay for the insured's at-
torney fees.45 In 1968, Rhode Island became the next jurisdiction to rule
in favor of independent counsel chosen by the insured.46 In Employers'
Fire Insurance Co. v. Beals,4' the Rhode Island Supreme Court sup-
ported an insured's right to refuse a defense under reservation of rights.
The court discussed the Prashker solution requiring the insurer to pay
reasonable costs of the insured's choice of counsel and examined a sec-
ond option of representation by two attorneys, one for the insurer and
one for the insured.48 While condoning both of these solutions, the court
added a further requirement that the insurer must approve the insured's
choice of counsel.4 9 The court reasoned that such ratification was neces-
sary because the insurer must bear the cost of such counsel; moreover,
the insurer has a valid interest in the choice of qualified counsel in order
to decrease the risk of an adverse verdict which it must ultimately pay.5 °
42. 346 Mass. 677, 195 N.E.2d 514 (1964).
43. Id. at 684, 195 N.E.2d at 519.
44. Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Parsons Corp., 430 F.2d 531, 538 (8th Cir. 1970).
45. Steel Erection Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 392 S.W.2d 713, 716 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
46. Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Beals, 103 R.I. 623, 240 A.2d 397 (1968).
47. Id. at 633-34, 240 A.2d at 403.
48. Id. at 634-35, 240 A.2d at 404.
49. Id.
50. Id. While the court acknowledged the financial hardship a requirement of independent
counsel imposed on the insurer, the court stated that "the necessity for this action stems from its [the
insurer's] failure to provide within any degree of clarity for this contingency... The insurer, being
the draftsman, should have set forth its provisions in such clear and distinct language as would have
avoided any doubt relative to the extent of its duty to defend." Id.
1988]
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IV. BREADTH OF OPINIONS REQUIRING INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
After Beals, the trend of allowing insureds to choose their counsel
continued to spread. At least eleven state courts"1 and federal courts in
seven circuits have recognized the necessity of separate counsel to repre-
sent insureds where conflicts exist.5 2 However, courts differ in the degree
of latitude given to insureds, and a number of recent decisions adopt a
restrictive view of the earlier stance on the issue.53
Many of the decisions on the independent counsel issue resulted
when an insurer claimed it had no duty to defend because of lack of
policy coverage and one of the parties sought declaratory judgment on
the issue.54 Although declaratory judgment has traditionally been used
to define the parties' rights and resolve conflicts, courts may now find it
inappropriate, particularly where the issue determining coverage will be
litigated in the third party suit. 55 Moreover, at least nine jurisdictions
51. Continental Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 608 P.2d 281 (Alaska 1980); San Diego
Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc. 162 Cal. App. 3d 358, 208 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1984);
Murphy v. Urso, 88 Ill. 2d 444, 430 N.E.2d 1079 (1982); Patrons Mut. Ins. Ass'n. v. Harmon, 240
Kan. 707, 732 P.2d 741 (1987); Dugas Pest Control v. Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co., 504
So. 2d 1051 (La. Ct. App. 1987); Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 347 A.2d 842
(1975); Magoun v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 346 Mass. 677, 195 N.E.2d 514 (1964); Burd v. Sussex
Mut. Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 383, 267 A.2d 7 (1970); Public Ser. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goldfarb, 53 N.Y.2d
392, 425 N.E.2d 810 (1981); Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Beals, 103 R.I. 623, 240 A.2d 397 (1968);
Steel Erection Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 392 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
52. Tews Funeral Home, Inc. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1987) (relying
on Illinois law); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Waste Management of Wis., Inc., 777 F.2d 366 (7th Cir.
1985) (relying on Wisconsin law); New York State Urban Dev. Corp. v. VSL Corp., 738 F.2d 61 (2d
Cir. 1984) (under New York law); Rhodes v. Chicago Ins. Co., 719 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1983) (relying
on Texas law); Previews, Inc. v. California Union Ins. Co., 640 F.2d 1026 (9th Cir. 1981) (under
California law); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Louis A. Roser Co., 585 F.2d 932 (8th Cir.
1978); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Parsons Corp. 430 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1970); St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Roach Bros., 639 F. Supp. 134 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Northland Ins. Co. v. Heck's Serv. Co.,
620 F. Supp. 107 (E.D. Ark. 1985); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Trane Co., 544 F. Supp. 669
(W.D. Wis. 1982), aff'd, 718 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1983); Southern Md. Agricultural Ass'n. v. Bitumi-
nous Casualty Corp., 539 F. Supp. 1295 (D. Md. 1982); All-Star Ins. Corp. v. Steel Bar, Inc., 324 F.
Supp. 160 (N.D. Ind. 1971).
53. See, eg., McGee v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. App. 3d 221, 221 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1985);
Saxon, Conflicts of Interest: Insurers' Expanding Duty to Defend and the Impact of "Cumis" Coun-
sel, 23 IDAHo L. REv. 351, 362-63 (1986-87).
54. Tews Funeral Home, Inc. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1987); Fire-
man's Fund Ins. Co. v. Waste Management of Wis., Inc., 777 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1985); New York
State Urban Dev. Corp. v. VSL Corp., 738 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984); Northland Ins. Co. v. Heck's
Serv. Co., 620 F. Supp. 107 (E.D. Ark. 1985); Southern Md. Agricultural Ass'n. v. Bituminous
Casualty Corp., 539 F. Supp. 1295 (D. Md. 1982); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers, 64 I1. 2d 187,
355 N.E.2d 24 (1976); Pekin Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 134 IIl. App. 3d 31, 479 N.E.2d 1078 (1985);
Nandorf, Inc. v. CNA Ins. Cos., 134 Ill. App. 3d 134, 479 N.E.2d 988 (1985); Patrons Mut. Ins.
Ass'n. v. Harmon, 240 Kan. 707, 732 P.2d 741 (1987); Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goldfarb, 53
N.Y.2d 392, 425 N.E.2d 810 (1981); Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 347 A.2d 842
(1975).
55. Northland Ins. Co.-v. Heck's Serv. Co., 620 F. Supp. 107, 108 (E.D. Ark. 1985); Maryland
8
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have stated that an insurer's decision to reserve its right to later contest
coverage presents a conflict of interest that cannot be resolved through
declaratory judgment. In such cases, the insured should receive the ser-
vices of an independent attorney. 6
Other courts have held that insurers must do more than merely re-
serve their rights to create a conflict of interest.57 In Illinois, the employ-
ment of independent counsel is justifiable only where the same insurer
owes a duty to defend two insureds who are adverse parties, or where
facts exist which would enable the insurer to shift liability from itself to
the insured. 8 The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania requires outward manifestation of the insurance com-
pany's intent to jeopardize the insured. 9 Other courts have stated that
only where the insurer's reservation of rights is based on grounds to be
established in the underlying suit does a sufficient conflict exist which
Casualty Co. v. Peppers, 64 Ill. 2d 187, 197, 355 N.E.2d 24, 30 (1976); Murphy v. Urso, 88 Ill. 2d
444, 455, 430 N.E.2d 1079, 1084 (1981); Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 405, 347
A.2d 842, 848 (1975); Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 383, 391-92, 267 A.2d 7, 11 (1970);
Prashker v. United States Guarantee Co., I N.Y.2d 584, 591, 136 N.E.2d 871, 875 (1956); Employ-
ers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Beals, 103 R.I. 623, 630, 240 A.2d 397, 402 (1968).
56. Rhodes v. Chicago Ins. Co., 719 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1983) (under Texas law); Previews, Inc.
v. California Union Ins. Co., 640 F.2d 1026 (9th Cir. 1981) (under California law); United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Louis A. Roser Co., 585 F.2d 932 (8th Cir. 1978); Northland Ins. Co. v.
Heck's Serv. Co., 620 F. Supp. 107 (E.D. Ark. 1985); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Trane Co., 544
F. Supp. 669 (W.D. Wis. 1982), afid, 718 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1983); Southern Md. Agricultural
Ass'n. v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 539 F. Supp. 1295 (D. Md. 1982); Patrons Mut. Ins. Ass'n. v.
Harmon, 240 Kan. 707, 732 P.2d 741 (1987); Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 347
A.2d 842 (1975); Magoun v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 346 Mass. 677, 195 N.E.2d 514 (1964); Burd v.
Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 383, 267 A.2d 7 (1970); Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goldfarb, 53
N.Y.2d 392, 425 N.E.2d 810 (1981).
57. Tews Funeral Home, Inc. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1037, 1046 (7th Cir. 1987);
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Roach Bros., 639 F. Supp. 134, 139 (E.D. Pa. 1986); McGee v.
Superior Court,. 176 Cal. App. 3d 221, 226, 221 Cal. Rptr. 421, 424 (1985); Clemmons v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 88 11. 2d 469, 478, 430 N.E.2d 1104, 1109 (1981); Pekin Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 134 Ill.
App. 3d 31, 35, 479 N.E.2d 1078, 1081 (1985).
58. Pekin Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 134 Ill. App. 3d 31, 35, 479 N.E.2d 1078, 1081 (1985).
The insurer negotiated a settlement on behalf of its named insured up to the policy limits. The
settlement, however, preserved the injured third party's right to sue the insured's employer, the
White Sox, who were also insureds under the terms of the policy. Despite the fact that the insurer
had previously left the Sox exposed to a lawsuit, the court found that the insurer's defense under a
reservation of rights did not constitute sufficient conflict of interest to warrant an independent attor-
ney for the White Sox. See also Zulkey and Pollard, The Duty to Defend After Exhaustion of Policy
Limits, FOR THE DEF., June 1985, at 21.
59. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Roach Bros., 639 F. Supp. 134, 139 (E.D. Pa. 1986). In
holding that a conflict of interest only exists where the defense actually acts in a prejudicial manner,
the court stated "[w]ith respect to the existence of both covered and uncovered claims or theories of
liability, the potential for conflict is much greater [than where the claim exceeds policy limits], but
actual conflict is not inevitable." Id.
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compels representation by an independent attorney.'6
V. THE MODERATE POSITION: BALANCING THE INTERESTS OF
BOTH INSURERS AND INSUREDS
Some jurisdictions attempt to return control to insurers by allowing
them to influence the choice of independent counsel. The court in Em-
ployers Fire Insurance Co. v. Beals6 held that the insurer should have the
opportunity to approve the insured's choice of counsel because the exper-
tise of the chosen attorney directly affects the amount the insurer may be
called on to indemnify.6' The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit recently held that principles of fairness dictated that an
insured's choice of counsel should be subject to the insurance company's
approval.63 In a later case, the Seventh Circuit approved a plan wherein
the insured would select defense counsel from a list of acceptable attor-
neys provided by the insurer.' 4
At least two courts have found that the insured's interests may be
adequately protected where the insurer chooses the independent defense
attorney. The Supreme Court of Kansas has approved such a procedure,
stating that it protects the rights of both parties and relieves the courts of
multiple suits.65 In Louisiana, a recent decision required that, because an
earlier state court decision precludes insureds from obtaining their own
counsel at the insurer's expense, the insurer must obtain separate counsel
for the insured.66
A third line of cases allows the insurer to specify in the insurance
contract that the insurer has the right to assist in the choice of counsel.
60. Continental Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 608 P.2d 281,289 (Alaska 1980); McGee v.
Superior Court, 176 Cal. App. 3d 221, 227, 221 Cal. Rptr. 421, 423 (1985).
61. 103 R.I. 623, 240 A.2d 397 (1968).
62. Id. at 635, 240 A.2d at 404.
63. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Waste Management of Wis., Inc., 777 F.2d 366, 370 (7th Cir.
1985). "There can be no more fair, sensible, and reasonable way for both parties to terminate this
collateral dispute and to get on with the trial . . ." of the primary suit. Id.
64. Tews Funeral Home, Inc. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1037, 1039 (7th Cir. 1987).
See also Berch, M. and Berch, R., Will the Real Counselfor the Insured Please Rise?, 19 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 27, 43 (1987); Comment, Reservation of Rights Notices and Nonwaiver Agreements, 12 PAc. L.J.
763, 779 (1981).
65. Patrons Mut. Ins. Ass'n. v. Harmon, 240 Kan. 707, 712, 732 P.2d 741, 745 (1987) (citing
Bell v. Tilton, 234 Kan. 461, 674 P.2d 468 (1983)).
66. Dugas Pest Control of Baton Rouge, Inc. v. Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co., 504 So.
2d 1051, 1054 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (citing Clemmons v. Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co., 230
So. 2d 887, 895 (La. Ct. App. 1969)).
[Vol. 24:281
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In New York State Urban Development Corp. v. VSL Corp.,67 the insur-
ance contract replaced the standard "duty-to-defend" clause with a
clause providing that the insurer would pay the fees of any attorney ap-
pointed by the insurer or any attorney chosen by the insured with the
insurer's approval. 6' Although it noted that New York law allows in-
sureds the right to choose their own counsel, the court found that an
insurance policy requiring the insurer's participation in the choice of in-
dependent counsel was "not inherently objectionable," provided that the
insurer acted in good faith and the chosen counsel was truly independent
and otherwise capable of defending the insured.69 Similarly, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York relied upon
VSL in upholding a local ordinance providing that county employees
must choose their defense counsel from one of three attorneys designated
by the county.7'
VI. THE OKLAHOMA PERSPECTIVE
Oklahoma courts have had few opportunities to consider the prob-
lem of conflicting interests between an insurer and its insured. However,
courts within the Tenth Circuit which have interpreted Oklahoma law
have not embraced the independent counsel trend.
In Traders & General Insurance Co. v. Rudco Oil & Gas Co.,7 the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the insurer violated the stan-
dard of "good faith and fair dealing" and thus could not avoid indemnifi-
cation of its insured on grounds that the insured settled without the
insurer's consent.72 Despite this holding, the court's opinion supported
the insurance industry practice of tendering defense under reservation of
rights and seeking declaratory judgment to determine the duty to de-
fend.73 Although the tone of the opinion favored insurers, the court did
reluctantly recognize that an insurer might use declaratory judgment to
67. 738 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984).
68. Id. at 65.
69. Id..
70. Suffolk County Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n. v. County of Suffolk, 595 F. Supp. 1471,
1482 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 751 F.2d 550 (2d Cir. 1985).
71. 129 F.2d 621 (10th Cir. 1942).
72. Id. at 628. The trial court found that the insurer's actions of refusing to recognize its
insured's "patent liability," refusing to cooperate with the settlement process, filing a declaratory
judgment action after agreeing to defend under reservation of rights, and then refusing to delay that
action until after litigation of the primary tort suit against the insured, all "evidenced that its [the
insurer's] primary and paramount interest was to establish its non-liability under the policy and not
the defense of the claims and suits against its assured." Id. at 624-25.
73. Id. at 628. It should be noted that since this 1942 opinion, the Oklahoma Legislature has
forbidden the use of declaratory judgments "concerning obligations alleged to arise under policies of
1988]
11
Price: The Insured's Right to Choose Defense Counsel
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1988
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
gain an "unfair advantage" over an insured74 and further stated that any
conflict of interest between the insurer and its insured subjects the in-
surer's conduct to closer scrutiny by the courts.7"
Nearly forty years later, however, a federal district court opinion
avoided any discussion of conflict of interest and refused the insured's
demand for payment of independent counsel fees incurred when the in-
surer disclaimed coverage.76 In Gay & Taylor, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Insurance Co., the plaintiff, a casualty adjustment firm, faced
actual and punitive damages in a suit alleging fraud and bad faith by the
firm's agent.78 When the insurance company refused responsibility for
any punitive damages, Gay & Taylor obtained independent counsel to
cover that aspect of its defense.79 Two days before trial, the insurer de-
nied coverage for the actual claims as well. The court found that this
action prejudiced the insured's defense and thus estopped the insurer
from denying indemnity for part of the subsequent settlement.80
Despite this obvious conflict between the interests of the insurer and
the insured, the court rejected the insured's claim that the insurer, St.
Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., should pay the independent attor-
ney's fees.81 The court stated that because the insurer's attorney re-
mained willing to defend, the efforts of the insured's independent
attorney were duplicative and were thus performed at the insured's ex-
pense.82 Therefore, although the court previously stated that the in-
surer's conduct in disclaiming coverage within two days of trial did
prejudice the insured, the court ignored the existence of this prejudice in
its discussion of fees for the insured's independent counsel.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has apparently not yet considered a
case involving a conflict of interest between the insurer and the insured.
However, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals stated in Davis v. National
insurance covering liability or indemnity against liability for such injuries." OKLA. STAT. tit. 12,
§ 1651 (1981).
74. Traders & General, 129 F.2d at 628.
75. Id. at 627.
76. Gay & Taylor, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 550 F. Supp. 710 (W.D. Okla. 1981).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 713.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 715. According to the court, "[p]rejudice to an insured is conclusively presumed
where an insurer assumes the defense of an action and denies liability on the eve of trial." Id. at 718.
81. Id at 718. The plaintiff also claimed attorney fees on grounds that the insurer acted in bad
faith. However, the court found that the plaintiff failed to prove the "requisite bad faith ....
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Pioneer Insurance Co.83 that costs of attorney fees incurred in an action
for bad faith against the insurer were not recoverable, even where the
jury had found that the insurer acted unreasonably and in bad faith.84
The court stated that Oklahoma law does not allow awards of attorney
fees unless the parties have so contracted or the statutes provide
otherwise. 5
Although attorney fees in Davis were not incurred within a conflict
of interest scenario but rather through a separate bad faith action against
the insurer, this case illustrates the difficulty of obtaining attorney fees in
Oklahoma absent specific statutory authority. An examination of the
Davis case and the federal court decisions discussed above indicates that
should a case having a palpable conflict of interest arise in the near fu-
ture, courts in this jurisdiction may be resistant to arguments that the
insured should be allowed independent counsel at the insurer's expense.
VII. PROS AND CONS Oft THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL TREND
Requiring insurance companies to provide independent counsel for
insureds fulfills an insured's expectations that the insurer will pay the
costs of defense counsel who will protect the insured's best interests. Re-
quiring independent counsel also prevents any possibility of unethical
conduct by any of the parties. Moreover, the increased costs involved
would motivate insurers to curtail indiscriminate decisions to contest
coverage. 86 However, the independent counsel trend has been criticized
on several points.
Not surprisingly, supporters of the insurance defense bar protest
that court decisions requiring use of independent counsel impugn the in-
tegrity of insurance defense attorneys. They further maintain that re-
quiring independent counsel is generally unnecessary.87 Such supporters
83. 515 P.2d 580 (Okla. CL App. 1973).
84. Id. at 583.
85. Id. at 584 (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 936 (1971)). Although § 936 does not expressly
authorize attorney fees for an action based on an insurance contract, attorney fees are awarded to the
prevailing party for a host of other actions, including "any civil action to recover on an open ac-
count, a statement of account, account stated, note, bill, negotiable instrument, or contract relating
to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, or merchandise, or for labor or services.. . ." OKLA. STAT.
tit. 12, § 936 (1981).
86. Saxon, Conflicts of Interest: Insurers' Expanding Duty to Defend and the Impact of
"Cumis" Counsel, 23 IDAHO L. Rav. 351, 360 (1986). The decision to refrain from reserving the
right to later contest coverage may also benefit third-party plaintiffs by removing "pressure... to
settle their claims at reduced amounts." Id.
87. Wick, A Commentary on Cumis, FOR THE DEF., Nov. 1985, at 2 (This commentator char-
acterized the conflict of interest discussion in San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins.
Soc'y, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 358, 208 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1984) as "an affront to insurance defense
1988]
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argue that insurers prefer to engage defense counsel who will fulfill their
professional responsibility obligations, both for purely ethical reasons
and because any violations would expose the insurer to expensive
retribution.88
Insurance defense counsel do not lack guidance on appropriate con-
duct in conflict of interest situations. The insurance defense bar provides
ethical direction on conflicts of interest through "Guiding Principles"
adopted by the National Conference of Lawyers and Liability Insurers
and approved by major liability insurers.89 Moreover, the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
also address the problem of conflicts of interest. Both the Code and the
Rules mandate that the insurer's attorney obtain the consent of both par-
ties to dual representation after a full disclosure regarding the risk of
future conflicts of interests.90 However, professional responsibility guide-
lines address only part of the problem when the interests of the insurer
counsel and to the insurance industry alike.") See also Hickman, Royal Globe, Cumis Doctrines
Rejected, FOR THE DEF., Sept. 1986, at 7-8 (In discussing a recent Washington Supreme Court
decision, Tank v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 105 Wash. 2d 381, 715 P.2d 1133 (1986), the
author states that "[u]nlike California, where the court impugned the integrity and professionalism
of all defense counsel, the Washington court reminded counsel of their professional ethical
obligations.").
88. Bianchesi, Coverage Disputes With the Insured; The Insurer's Perspective, 48 INS. COUNS, J.
153, 153 (1981); Wick, supra note 87, at 2.
89. Weithers, The Coverage Role of Defense Counsel, 48 INS. COUNS. J. 156, 158. Section IV of
the Guiding Principles provides as follows:
In any claim or in any suit where the attorney selected by the company to defend the claim
or action becomes aware of facts or information which indicate to him a question of cover-
age in the matter being defended or any other conflict of interest between the company and
the insured with respect to the defense of the matter, the attorney should promptly inform
both the company and the insured, preferably in writing, of the nature and extent of the
conflicting interest. In any such suit, the company or its attorney should invite the insured
to retain his own counsel at his own expense to represent his separate interest.
Id. at 158. Although the Guiding Principles were adopted by the American Bar Association in 1972,
they were rescinded in 1980. Moore, Insurer's Preservation of Rights, FOR THE DEF., July 1984, at
26 n.18.
90. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1982); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983).
DR 5-105(a) of the MODEL CODE provides: "A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if
the exercise of his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be
adversely affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment, or if it would be likely to involve
him in representing different interests .. "
However, DR 5-105(c) provides: "[A] lawyer may represent multiple clients if it is obvious that
he can adequately represent the interest of each and if each consents to the representation after full
disclosure of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of his independent professionaljudgment on behalf of each." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 5-105 (1982).
Rule 1.7 of the MODEL RULES provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be directly
adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the relation-
ship with the other client; and
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and the insured conflict. Neither the Code of Professional Responsibility
nor the Rules of Professional Conduct answer the crucial question of
who must pay for the independent counsel should the insured not con-
sent to defense by the insurer's attorney. An individual insured may be
unable to pay for an independent attorney and thus feel compelled to risk
defense by the insurer. The independent counsel trend prevents such de-
cisions by requiring that insurers cover the costs of independent counsel.
In addition to the argument that procuring independent counsel at
the insurer's expense is largely unnecessary, the trend has been criticized
on several other points. One major point of contention is the problem of
increased costs to the insurer.9 Insurers will often need to pay for two
attorneys, one of which may not bill at the lower rate commonly charged
by insurance defense firms.9" Critics contend that the prospects of such
additional expense may coerce the insurer into extending coverage to the
insured even when unwarranted in order to remove any conflict. 93
A second common criticism concerns the qualifications of the in-
dependent counsel chosen by the insured. Defense attorneys who are
frequently retained by the insurer may have far greater experience than
the insured's counsel.94 Such inexperience may require the attorney to
expend more effort and time than would an experienced defense attorney.
This translates into greater expense, in addition to the increase borne by
the insurer accustomed to paying discounted rates.95 Further, the choice
of an inexperienced defense attorney may be detrimental to the interests
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materi-
ally limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the
lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple clients in a
single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the implications
of the common representation and the advantages and risks involved.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983).
91. Berg, Losing Control of the Defense - the Insured's Right to Select His Own Counsel, FOR
THE DEF., July 1984, at 20; Comment, Reservation of Rights Notices and Nonwaiver Agreements, 12
PAC. L.J. 763, 778 (1981).
92. Comment, Reexamining Conflicts of Interest: When Is Private Counsel Necessary?, 17 PAC.
L.J. 1421, 1431 (1986).
93. Berg, supra note 91, at 20. "Too often the insurer insists on taking a coverage position
which, although theoretically sound, will cost more than it is worth .... It may simply be more
cost-effective to voluntarily extend coverage." Berg, supra note 91, at 20.
94. Berg, supra note 91, at 20; Comment, supra note 91, at 779.
95. Comment, supra note 92, at 1431-32. "Private rates may be higher in comparison since
standard defense counsel are accustomed to handling insurance defense cases and can therefore
charge lower fees. Further, the amount of business generated by the insurer for standard counsel
allows the demand of lower rates." Comment, supra note 92, at 1431-32 (citing Berg, After Cumis:
Regaining Control of the Defense, FOR THE DEF., Aug. 1985, at 13-14.).
1988]
15
Price: The Insured's Right to Choose Defense Counsel
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1988
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
of the insured in avoiding liability, as well as the interests of the insurer
in avoiding payment of a judgment. 96
In addition, independent counsel requirements may make settlement
decisions more difficult. 97 An insurer with access to all the facts concern-
ing the occurrence at issue may enter settlement discussions more confi-
dent of its negotiating position. Where the insured's counsel attempts to
protect its client by withholding information vital to the insurer's deci-
sion-making process, opportunities for settlement may go unrecognized
to the detriment of both the insurer and the insured. 98
In an attempt to correct some of the above disadvantages, California
enacted legislation in 1987 regulating the choice of independent coun-
sel.99 The new law provides that a conflict of interest may arise "when
an insurer reserves its rights on a given issue and the outcome of that
coverage issue can be controlled by counsel first retained by the insurer
for the defense of the claim .... ,"oo Punitive damages and claims above
policy limits no longer create such a conflict. 101 The law allows the in-
surer to require that independent counsel meet certain qualifications,
such as possessing at least five years' tort litigation experience, and limits
fees to the rates the insurer generally pays other insurance defense attor-
neys. 102 Rather than leaving the choice entirely to the insured, the law
also allows insurers to specify within the insurance policy a method of
selecting independent counsel. 10 3 This legislation should return some
96. Comment, supra note 92, at 1432.
97. Id. at 1433.
98. Id., citing Berg, After Cumis: Regaining Control of the Defense, FOR THE DEF., Aug. 1985,
at 14-15. But see Saxon, supra note 86, at 360 for a different interpretation. ("Cumis also has had
the effect of bringing about quicker settlements as insurers have a greater incentive to close files on
which they are paying two sets of attorneys.").
99. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 2860(a) (West 1987 Supp.) As discussed earlier, California courts have
firmly established an insurer's right to independent counsel where the insurer's reservation of rights
creates a conflict of interest. See, eg., San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc.,
162 Cal. App. 3d 358, 208 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1984).
100. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 2860(b) (West 1987 Supp.).
101. Id.
102. Id. at § 2860(c), which provides in part:
(c) When the insured has selected independent counsel to represent him or her, the in-
surer may exercise its right to require that the counsel selected by the insured possess
certain minimum qualifications which may include that the selected counsel have (1) at
least five years of tort litigation practice which includes substantial defense experience in
the subject at issue in the litigation, and (2) errors and omissions coverage. The insurer's
obligation to pay . . . is limited to the rates which are actually paid by the insurer to
attorneys retained by it in the ordinary course of business in the defense of similar actions
in the community where the claim arose or is being defended ....
Id.
103. Id. at 2860(a).
[Vol. 24:281
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measure of control to the insurer and prevent spiraling litigation costs
within California.
VIII. SUGGESTIONS FOR OKLAHOMA
Given time, Oklahoma courts will surely encounter cases involving
serious conflicts between the best interests of the insured and the insurer.
In order to avoid penalizing the insured who is threatened by the in-
surer's adverse interests, the insurer should pay the costs of independent
counsel to defend the insured. However, it is not necessary to sacrifice all
the benefits afforded by the traditional insurer-retained defense attorney
system.
California statutory law and court opinions from several jurisdic-
tions provide guidance on how to best preserve the legitimate interests of
both parties. t04 The insured should be allowed to choose an independent
attorney from a list of competent defense attorneys having no connection
or relationship with the insurer. In the alternative, the insurer should
have the opportunity to approve the insured's choice of counsel. Regard-
less of the method used, the insurer should only be obligated to pay rea-
sonable costs, as measured by fees paid by the insurer to its regular
counsel. With these guidelines, both the insurer and the insured may be
assured of receiving the benefits for which they contracted in the insur-
ance agreement.
IX. CONCLUSION
The majority of liability lawsuits do not involve conflicts between
the interests of the defendant-insured and the insurer, but should a con-
flict arise, the insured's best interests may be compromised. In an at-
tempt to prevent injury to insureds involved in such a situation, a
number of jurisdictions have expanded the insurer's contractual duty to
defend to include a duty to provide independent defense counsel. Yet
critics charge that this solution imposes too harsh a burden on the in-
surer in the form of increased defense costs, and may be detrimental to
insurer and insured alike should the chosen counsel be less capable than
the insurer's attorney.
104. Tews Funeral Home, Inc. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1987); Fire-
man's Fund Ins. Co. v. Waste Management of Wis., Inc., 777 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1985); New York
State Urban Dev. Corp. v. VSL Corp., 738 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984); Patrons Mut. Ins. Ass'n. v.
Harmon, 240 Kan. 707, 732 P.2d 741 (1987); Dugas Pest Control v. Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland
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A few jurisdictions have chosen a moderate approach which pro-
tects the insured's interests while allowing the insurer to control costs
and assure the selection of competent counsel. Although the conflict of
interest problem between insurer and insured has yet to receive judicial
attention in Oklahoma, such conflicts will eventually be litigated. Both
the judiciary and the Oklahoma legislature should act to preserve the
interests and expectations of the insurer and the insured.
Michelle Kissell Price
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